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Commentary
April 26, 2006, was the 20th anniversary of
the Chernobyl accident, the second major sin-
gle exposure to radiation of a substantial popu-
lation. It is relevant to the current view of the
consequences of Chernobyl to reflect on the
understanding in 1965 of the health conse-
quences of the ﬁrst major event, radiation from
the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
Japan, in 1945. The only significant conse-
quences observed in survivors 20 years after the
atomic bombs were increases in leukemia and
thyroid cancer, and the general view of the
future was reassuring. In 1974, a significant
increase in solid cancers was detected, and
nearly 50 years after the event, an unexpected
increase was found in noncancer diseases
(Shimizu et al. 1992). Today, leukemia and
thyroid cancer form only a small fraction of
the accepted total radiation-related health
detriment. 
In 1990, four years after the Chernobyl
accident, an increase in thyroid cancer was
found in children exposed to fallout from the
accident [International Atomic Energy
Authority (IAEA) 1991]. Two years later, the
first reports in the Western literature of an
increase in childhood thyroid cancer (CTC)
in Belarus were published (Baverstock et al.
1992; Kazakov et al. 1992). In 2000, about
2,000 cases of thyroid cancer had been
reported in those exposed as children in the
former Soviet Socialist Union, and in 2005,
the number was estimated at 4,000 [World
Health Organization (WHO) 2005a]; the lat-
est estimate for the year 2056 ranges from
3,400 to 72,000 (Cardis et al. 2006). The
effects are not limited by national borders;
Poland has recorded cases (Niedziela et al.
2004) in spite of a rapid precautionary distri-
bution of stable iodine (Nauman and Wolff
1993). The causative agent, 131I, was detected
in many European countries with as yet
unknown effects. Interestingly, a significant
increase in leukemia has not been reliably
reported in the three most affected countries.
This dramatic contrast between the two
incidents is in part due to the different types
of radiation exposure, but both show that the
effects of massive exposures to radiation are
immensely complex. In comparing the health
effects after Chernobyl with those after the
atomic bombs, it must be remembered that
apart from workers in or close to the power
plant, the Chernobyl accident involved
mainly exposure to radioactive isotopes, and
the atomic bombs primarily involved direct
exposure to γ-rays and neutrons. Because of
the prominence given to thyroid carcinoma
after Chernobyl, less attention has been given
to whole-body exposure from the ingestion
and inhalation of all isotopes, together with
the shine from the radioactive cloud and
deposited radioactivity. Consideration of the
health effects of Chernobyl must take into
account both tissue-speciﬁc doses due to iso-
tope concentration and whole-body doses.
The most prominent tissue-specific dose is
that to the thyroid, largely from 131I, with a
smaller contribution from short-lived isotopes
of iodine. For many in the 30-km zone
(135,000), there were relatively high absorbed
doses to other organs as well as the thyroid
until evacuation (Baverstock and Williams
2003), and for those living in the contami-
nated areas around the 30-km zone (5 mil-
lion), relatively high dose rate exposure (days
to weeks) was followed by prolonged (years)
exposure to a low dose rate. This exposure
was a complex mixture of external radiation
and internal emitters. For others living farther
from the accident, in Western Europe, for
example, their average exposure was equiva-
lent to an additional ≤ 50% of average annual
natural background level of radiation. About
600,000 liquidators assisted with the cleanup.
Those working at the site shortly after the
accident (200,000) received substantial doses.
For all of these groups, estimates of numbers
of fatal cancers can be derived from the collec-
tive doses. However, such estimates depend
on the assumed risk coefficient, but of the
order of 60,000 such fatalities in total can be
estimated, based on the collective dose esti-
mated by the United Nations Scientific
Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation
(UNSCEAR 1988), less than half of which
would derive from the declared contami-
nated areas. A more recent estimate of the
numbers of fatal cancers based on a collective
dose of less than half the UNSCEAR esti-
mate gives a central value of 16,000 (95%
confidence interval, 7,000–38,000) (Cardis
et al. 2006).
In this commentary, we will assess the
established health consequences of the acci-
dent; identify some of the unanswered health
issues; assess whether there are effects yet to be
realized; evaluate the international response;
and consider how to improve the response to
future accidents. 
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BACKGROUND: The Chernobyl accident in 1986 caused widespread radioactive contamination and
enormous concern. Twenty years later, the World Health Organization and the International
Atomic Energy Authority issued a generally reassuring statement about the consequences.
Accurate assessment of the consequences is important to the current debate on nuclear power.
OBJECTIVES: Our objectives in this study were to evaluate the health impact of the Chernobyl acci-
dent, assess the international response to the accident, and consider how to improve responses to
future accidents. 
DISCUSSION: So far, radiation to the thyroid from radioisotopes of iodine has caused several thousand
cases of thyroid cancer but very few deaths; exposed children were most susceptible. The focus on
thyroid cancer has diverted attention from possible nonthyroid effects, such as mini-satellite instabil-
ity, which is potentially important. The international response to the accident was inadequate and
uncoordinated, and has been unjustiﬁably reassuring. Accurate assessment of Chernobyl’s future
health effects is not currently possible in the light of dose uncertainties, current debates over radia-
tion actions, and the lessons from the late consequences of atomic bomb exposure.
CONCLUSIONS: Because of the uncertainties over the dose from and the consequences of the
Chernobyl accident, it is essential that investigations of its effects should be broadened and sup-
ported for the long term. Because of the problems with the international response to Chernobyl,
the United Nations should initiate an independent review of the actions and assignments of the
agencies concerned, with recommendations for dealing with future international-scale accidents.
These should involve independent scientists and ensure cooperation rather than rivalry.
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Firmly established. Thyroid carcinoma. By far,
the most prominent health consequence of the
accident is the increase in thyroid cancer
among those exposed as children. The medical
authorities in Belarus and Ukraine were aware
in 1990 that the incidence of the rare (typically
about 1/106children/year) CTC was increas-
ing, particularly in children living close to the
reactor (IAEA 1991). Initially, various non–
Chernobyl-related causes were suggested for
the increase in thyroid carcinoma. In terms of
radiation dose, the most likely culprit was 131I,
a copious product of nuclear fission with an
8.1-day half-life. 131I is rapidly taken up by the
thyroid but was widely regarded as carrying lit-
tle risk of thyroid neoplasia. Swedish epidemi-
ologic studies of the widespread use of 131I in
diagnosis and treatment of thyroid disease
found no significant risk of thyroid cancer
(Holm 1999). Other isotopes of iodine and
tellurium-132 were also released in very large
amounts, but because of their much shorter
half-lives, their most signiﬁcant contribution to
the thyroid dose occurred only in those living
near the reactor.
The ﬁrst reports of the increase in Belarus
(Baverstock et al. 1992; Kazakov et al. 1992)
were received with skepticism by the scientiﬁc
community, but the risks were shown to be
real (Williams 1996). Analysis of thyroid car-
cinogenesis after X-ray exposure also showed
clearly that the younger the subject at expo-
sure, the higher the risk (Ron et al. 1995). The
almost complete lack of children in the
Swedish studies thus accounted for the appar-
ent lack of a carcinogenic risk from 131I. It has
since become increasingly clear that 131I is as
carcinogenic in children as X rays (Cardis et al.
2005a). The child’s thyroid is one of the most
sensitive human tissues to cancer induction by
radiation. Because iodine is a volatile element,
its release from fractured fuel rods is inevitable.
Much has been made of the fact that dif-
ferentiated thyroid cancer is an eminently cur-
able disease. Only a very small number of
deaths from Chernobyl-related thyroid carci-
noma have occurred so far. However, the pre-
ferred treatment regime, total thyroidectomy
followed by 131I treatment to destroy metas-
tases, is not always fully effective. Death from
papillary carcinoma of the thyroid is rare, usu-
ally of the order of 5–10%. Because of the
slow growth of the tumor, it is premature to
assume that the even lower death rate for cur-
rent Chernobyl-related cases will be main-
tained, particularly for cases yet to occur. An
older age at onset can be associated with a less
favorable prognosis. Currently, those exposed
as small children are now adolescents or young
adults but continue to carry an increased risk
of developing thyroid carcinoma. The inci-
dence of thyroid cancer in those who were
adults at the time of exposure is reported to
have increased in the many exposed popula-
tions (Mahoney et al. 2004), although the
relationship to radiation is not clear. Screening
has become more sophisticated, and increased
ascertainment may be a major factor (Jacob
et al. 2006). The concentration of effort on
the major increase in those exposed as children
has meant that the possible much smaller risk
to adults has not been adequately investigated. 
Acute radiation sickness. A small group of
liquidators and plant workers received very
high whole-body doses. Among these, about
150 individuals were treated for acute radiation
sickness; 28 of these died within a relatively
short time (WHO 2005a). Approximately 20
more have since died from probable radiation-
related diseases.
Psychological consequences. Psychological
effects are of considerable importance (Havenaar
et al. 1997). They arise from an understand-
able fear of exposure to an unknown amount
of an intangible but potentially dangerous
agent, fear for exposed children, mistrust of
reassurances from the authorities, and for hun-
dreds of thousands of people, the conse-
quences of forced evacuation from home and
land. For some, the stress from these experi-
ences has precipitated psychological illness; for
others, an increased consumption of alcohol
and cigarettes; and for still others, dietary
changes to avoid perceived contamination.
Some deaths from suicide, cirrhosis, or lung
cancer could be regarded as indirect conse-
quences of the accident and the subsequent
measures taken. Whatever the view the
nuclear industry may have about the irra-
tionality of these consequences, they are real
and have an important impact on public
health, and so deserve greater attention.
Genetic consequences. Another conse-
quence, not as firmly established as thyroid
cancer, is mini-satellite instability (MSI) in
children born to exposed fathers after
Chernobyl (Dubrova et al. 1996, 1997,
2002b). MSI is not a classical genetic effect,
and its implications for health are far from
clear. A similar effect has been seen in the chil-
dren and grandchildren of men exposed to
weapons testing in Semipalatinsk (Dubrova
et al. 2002a) and a parallel phenomenon, tan-
dem repeat instability, occurs in laboratory
mice (Barber et al. 2002). MSI has not been
observed in the survivors of the atomic bomb-
ings (Kodaira et al. 1995), in studies of
Chernobyl cleanup workers (Livshits et al.
2001), or in radiotherapy patients (May et al.
2000). MSI is considerably more frequent in
relation to radiation dose than classical genetic
effects and apparently does not become
diluted in subsequent generations. Although
its clinical significance is uncertain (Bouffler
et al. 2006), it is of some concern, certainly
more than the Chernobyl Forum (WHO
2005a) gave it credit for.
These issues are particularly relevant in
view of developments in radiobiological
research over the past 15 years. The apparently
simple relationship between radiation dose and
its effects are being reappraised. In the early
1990s, two previously unacknowledged effects
of radiation were reported, genomic instability
and the bystander effect (Appendix). These
effects are not accommodated by the current
theoretical framework. Also in 1986, the risk
per unit dose accrued from Chernobyl would
have been assumed to be half that estimated
from the atomic bombs in Japan. A recent
detailed analysis of the Japanese experience
suggested that the risk for those exposed to the
lower doses (Pierce and Preston 2000) could
even be supralinear (Brenner et al. 2003;
Brenner and Sachs 2006). Furthermore, the
accuracy of the standard models for inferring
doses from internal exposure have been ques-
tioned by the U.K. Committee Examining
Radiation Risk of Internal Emitters (CERRIE
2004). There is, therefore, considerable uncer-
tainty in translating collective dose to health
detriment and fatalities.
Unanswered issues. Birth defects. There
have been many claims of an increased inci-
dence of congenital anomalies in children
born shortly after the accident. Some cases
reported in the press show abnormalities simi-
lar to those following the use of thalidomide
in pregnancy, and thalidomide was apparently
available in the Soviet Union. It is not possible
to separate Chernobyl-related abnormalities
from those due to other causes or from the
effects of increased ascertainment. Although a
slight increase in minor conditions has been
observed, there does not appear to have been a
major increase in serious conditions such as
limb deformities.
Leukemia. Intensive efforts have been
made to detect an increase in leukemia, which
is strongly associated with radiation. No statis-
tically signiﬁcant increases of those forms asso-
ciated with radiation have been reported, but
increases in chronic lymphatic leukemia, a
non–radiation-related disease of older age,
may testify to increased case ascertainment
(WHO 2005a). However, the level of increase
expected, given the received doses, anticipated
risk factor, and the rarity of the condition,
would only be detected by large analytical—as
opposed to ecological—epidemiology studies.
In the future. Experience from Japan
shows that many effects of whole-body radia-
tion exposure may not be apparent for decades.
While the short initial latent period associated
with the thyroid carcinoma after Chernobyl,
together with the very large amounts of
radioactive isotopes of iodine released, have led
to a huge effort to reconstruct thyroid doses,
much less attention has been paid to whole-
body doses. Measurements of the initial expo-
sure phase for those in the 30-km zone, while
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body of many individuals that were > 1 Gy,
with average doses to some 25,000 Belarusian
evacuees of a substantial fraction of a Gray
(Baverstock and Williams 2003). Doses
received by infants evacuated from the 30-km
zone are estimated to be in the range of
0.03–2 Sv (Mück et al. 2002; Pröhl et al.
2002), well within the range that led to a sig-
nificant rise in cancer incidence after the
atomic bombs. As well as the thyroid, other
organs show some concentration of iodine.
One particularly important tissue is breast
epithelium, which can concentrate iodine and
receive γ-radiation from isotopes in the lung or
thyroid. Some particular groups at exposure
may show an excess incidence of breast cancer
now or in the future (Pukkala et al. 2006). A
signiﬁcant rise in incidence of a range of malig-
nancies in the population exposed to high lev-
els of fallout, particularly those exposed as
children, is clearly possible. All too often the
phrase “no increase has been observed” con-
ceals the lack of an adequate study.
The full complexity of the exposure regime
has not been adequately explored, and the esti-
mation of whole-body and many tissue-speciﬁc
doses is imprecise or unknown. The radiation
dose received from the atomic bombs was still
being revised 50 years after the event. Taking
into account the results of new research and
the CERRIE report (CERRIE 2004), it is very
difficult to derive with any confidence the
likely levels of health detriment from the esti-
mated dose levels. It is also too soon to make
an accurate assessment of longer-term effects
from those already observed.
In the light of this level of uncertainty,
the case is compelling for international
research surveillance of the millions of people
exposed to fallout from Chernobyl and selec-
tive follow-up of those exposed to high levels
similar to that following the atomic bombings
in Japan (Baverstock 1998; Williams 2002;
Williams and Baverstock 2006).
The International Response
An accident on the scale of Chernobyl would
be a challenge to most countries. However,
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR) felt able to deal with the conse-
quences, at least up until 1989, when it sought
assistance from the WHO and the IAEA to
evaluate the consequences of the accident in
environmental and health terms. In response,
the IAEA created the International Chernobyl
Project, which oversaw a visit to the affected
areas and made a comprehensive report on
radiological consequences and protective mea-
sures (IAEA 1991). The team seems then to
have been disbanded. Public concern was
widespread, and the questions posed by the
public to IAEA expert panels at public meet-
ings show the extent of this concern (IAEA
1991). Following the breakup of the USSR,
the consequences became the responsibility of
three newly independent states: Ukraine,
Russian Federation, and Belarus, the poorest
and most heavily affected. Other UN organi-
zations then became more involved. In May of
1991, the WHO headquarters (WHO/HQ)
set up the International Project on the Health
Effects of the Chernobyl Accident (IPHECA)
with > $20 million in funding, primarily from
Japan. By that time, the European Regional
Office of the WHO (WHO/EURO) had a
strong program in place, following its initial
response to the accident, to assist its member
states other than the USSR in their responses to
the accident. In October 1991, WHO/EURO
opened an office in Rome with an assign-
ment including the effects of ionizing radia-
tion on health; this office quickly became
involved with the affected countries. Over
the following year or two, the UN Ofﬁce for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA) undertook fundraising and pro-
vided humanitarian assistance for the three
now very economically disadvantaged coun-
tries, as did the UN Educational Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (in
recognition of the psychosocial consequences),
the European Commission (EC), the Red
Cross, the Sasakawa Foundation from Japan,
the United States, Netherlands, Germany, and
several other countries, nongovernmental
organizations, and charities. Many of these
organizations, the EC, United States, and
Japan, among others, also supported research.
Quite early on, attempts were made by
the United States, WHO/HQ, and OCHA
to coordinate both the humanitarian and
research initiatives. One problem was a lack
of clarity over the leadership of the newly
independent states: the Russian Federation
regarded itself as senior to the others, the acci-
dent occurred in Ukraine, and Belarus was
the most affected country. The United States
and WHO/HQ each claimed to have made
exclusive agreements with the affected
states—IPHECA to the effect that it was to
be an umbrella under which all research and
humanitarian activities would be coordinated,
and the United States to the effect that it had
priority where the conduct of research was
concerned. OCHA claimed that its mandate
overrode other humanitarian-linked agree-
ments. The result was a serious lack of coordi-
nation and a fair measure of chaos on both
humanitarian and research fronts.
The realization that there was a real
radiation-related increase in the rare CTC
dominated the research. By 1995, excess rela-
tive risks for some areas of Belarus were of
the order of 200 (Stsjazhko et al. 1995). This
meant that almost every case of CTC was
related to the accident and to radiation expo-
sure. Studies were carried out to understand
the molecular basis of the carcinogenesis and
to look for a marker for radiation etiology
that would aid the resolution of claims for
compensation from nuclear industry workers
and atomic test veterans. The U.S. research
was carried out with the knowledge that
Congress had ordered a reassessment of the
thyroid doses from 131I from the Nevada
atomic weapons test series. In 1992, when the
increase in CTC in Belarus was ﬁrst reported,
that reassessment was complete, although not
yet made public. It showed that earlier assess-
ments had significantly underestimated the
doses. Before Chernobyl, this information
would not have caused great concern in the
United States because of the belief that,
despite its radioactivity, 131I was not carcino-
genic. It happened that the same National
Cancer Institute (NCI) division was responsi-
ble for both the national dosimetric reassess-
ment and the post-Chernobyl research. The
former (NCI 1997) was not published until
after a newspaper leak in 1997; the latter was a
well-designed, long-term cohort study of a
population of children with assigned thyroid
doses, which was not expected to yield results
for several decades. Many epidemiologic studies
(mainly ecologic) built a strong circumstantial
case for a link between exposure to 131I and
thyroid cancer, definitively established by a
case–control study in 2005 (Cardis et al.
2005a). What the research has not so far
yielded is a marker for radiation etiology.
Chernobyl-related cancers have so far been
predominantly papillary cancers and initially
showed a high incidence of RET gene
rearrangements, also found in spontaneous
cancers (Nikiforov et al. 1997). Papillary car-
cinoma has been increasing in incidence over
the last half-century. Although partly due to
ascertainment, a contribution of radiation
from atomic weapons testing, medical, and
dental sources cannot be excluded.
The accident at Chernobyl tested the
capacities of the relevant international organi-
zations, and their responses left much to be
desired. Initially they were faced with the
problem that, although many countries were
exposed to radioactive fallout, it was regarded
as an internal matter by the country in which
it occurred. The next difﬁculty came with the
breakup of that country, resulting in three
separate countries containing heavily exposed
populations. When outside assistance was
eventually welcomed, there were many sepa-
rate initiatives, and the level of coordination
left a great deal to be desired.
The response of the WHO was hampered
by internal disagreements. The $20 million
used by WHO/HQ to fund the IPHECA
program seems to have been largely spent on
unproductive pilot projects and on providing
training and laboratory and medical diagnostic
equipment for the three countries. The largest
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had the least exposure (WHO 1995). A sepa-
rate initiative was taken by WHO/EURO,
which set up the International Thyroid
Project. The project suffered from inadequate
funding but tried to achieve coordination of
patient care and related research on conse-
quences of iodine deficiency in the three
affected countries. The WHO/HQ confer-
ence, held in November 1995 in Geneva,
focused primarily on health issues. It was
poorly prepared and attracted a significant
number of dubious reports; the proceedings
were not published in an accessible form. The
lack of coordination between WHO/HQ and
WHO/EURO, the political nature of some
decisions of WHO/HQ, and the uncertainty
over the division of its responsibility with the
IAEA all contributed to its problems. In addi-
tion, other international organizations
regarded the IPHECA program as such a fail-
ure that they were reluctant to collaborate
with the WHO and would not accept its lead-
ership as envisaged by the umbrella concept.
The IAEA was invited in 1989 to provide
an assessment by international experts of the
measures taken by the USSR. A team visited
some of the affected areas in 1990, and a
detailed report (IAEA 1991) assessed the envi-
ronmental contamination, radiation exposure,
and health effects. Cases of thyroid cancer
occurring in exposed children in both Belarus
and Ukraine in 1990 were reported to the
team but were apparently not followed up
(IAEA 1991); the general tenor of the report
suggests that they were largely discounted
because of the belief that 131I had a low car-
cinogenic risk and that the latent period was
too short. The report concluded that “there
may be a statistically detectable increase in the
incidence of thyroid carcinoma in the future.”
The attitude of senior IAEA officials in the
next few years was antagonistic toward reports
of a radiation-related increase in thyroid carci-
noma incidence. The mandate of the IAEA
enjoins it to promote the peaceful use of
nuclear technology, and this, together with its
close links to the nuclear industry, would not
make evidence of carcinogenic risks following
a nuclear accident welcome news. The WHO
seems to accept that the IAEA has the domi-
nant role in the investigation of health effects
of nuclear accidents, as clearly indicated in a
recent report (Peplow 2006). This situation
needs to be reassessed to avoid possible con-
ﬂicts of interest. 
The IAEA meeting in Vienna in 1996
provided a major opportunity for policy devel-
opment for the coming years. The ﬁnal state-
ment by the conference president, Angela
Merkel, then German Minister of the
Environment, could have laid the foundations
for a properly funded long-term study of all
the potential health effects, but the statement,
presumably prepared for her by IAEA ofﬁcials,
failed to provide any support or direction for
this (IAEA 1996).
The EC was concerned about the conse-
quences of Chernobyl, which took place in
Europe and led to fallout across the European
Union. It supported work on the incidence,
scientiﬁc background and appropriate therapy
of the thyroid cancers, and on the psychologi-
cal consequences. The EC also provided exten-
sive support for humanitarian aspects and to
remedy the environmental consequences. It
maintained close contact with the United
States, but after one joint meeting with
WHO/EURO in 1992, the EC very strongly
discouraged any collaborative studies with the
WHO for the next 5 years. Some collaboration
was finally established after an independent
group of scientists proposed creating a
Chernobyl tumor bank to save unique material
for future study. The EC provided core fund-
ing, and a collaborative project involving the
three affected countries, the EC, United States
(NCI), WHO/HQ, and Japan was created
(Thomas and Williams 2000).
From 1991, UNESCO operated a very
effective psychosocial rehabilitation program
opening nine rehabilitation centers for adults
and children, especially in areas where relo-
cated people were housed. In particular these
centers acted to promulgate reliable informa-
tion about the risks entailed in living in conta-
minated areas. 
In 2001, the United Nations Development
Program mounted a needs assessment mission,
which identiﬁed exposed populations relocated
or continuing to live in contaminated regions
that “continue to face disproportionate suffer-
ing in terms of health, social conditions, and
economic opportunity” (UN 2002). The
report (UN 2002) described the most vulnera-
ble groups as facing a “progressive downward
spiral of living conditions induced by the con-
sequences of the accident” and outlined a
10-year strategy for tackling and reversing this
spiral. A key element of that strategy for recov-
ery was to be a body called the International
Chernobyl Research Board (ICRB), with a
broad assignment including making recom-
mendations for research. As noted above, the
theoretical basis for understanding the effects
of radiation on health have been in a state of
ﬂux since the early 1990s; the earlier concepts
(Appendix) are still adhered to because they
underpin the present radiation protection
framework. Chernobyl has proved fertile
ground for views that dissent from those of the
establishment, with claims of much greater
health impact based on observations or unsub-
stantiated risk coefﬁcients; mistrust of many of
the major international bodies has led to the
perverse equation that dismissal by the estab-
lishment necessarily testiﬁes to correctness. The
ICRB was therefore envisaged as broader and
more inclusive than established bodies such as
UNSCEAR, the International Committee for
Radiation Protection (ICRP), and the IAEA,
and as a forum where all views could be
debated in a rational way and mistrust less-
ened. Rather than creating an ICRB, the
Chernobyl Forum, lacking the broader repre-
sentation originally envisaged, was instigated
on the initiative of the IAEA to evaluate the
health and environmental consequences of the
accident. The health section, led by the
WHO/HQ, reported recently (WHO 2005a);
this highly technical document (WHO 2005a)
builds on an earlier review (UNSCEAR 2000).
The report was launched as a landmark digest
report, with a press release from WHO/HQ
headed, “Chernobyl: The True Scale of the
Accident” (WHO 2005b). It states, “A total of
up to 4000 people could eventually die of radi-
ation exposure from … Chernobyl.” The
emphasis is on reassurance, but it is notable
that the headline estimate of deaths is less than
half the number that can be derived from the
body of the report. Neither is it safe to assume
that the very low death rate from thyroid can-
cer to date will apply to future cases, let alone
assume that no further deaths from cancer will
occur in the present cases. There is no previ-
ous experience of an accident such as this, and
the long-term risks cannot be predicted with
any certainty either in the heavily exposed
areas or in the much wider areas with low-level
exposures. Certainly there is a clear indication
that there is a risk for low dose and low dose
rate exposure (Cardis et al. 2005b; Krestinina
et al. 2005), but there are also large uncertain-
ties regarding its magnitude. The least that
could have been expected from bodies such as
the WHO and IAEA would have been sup-
port for long-term studies of such a unique
event. Without these studies, society will not
be able to assess the future risks associated
with nuclear accidents, judge what precautions
need to be taken, or plan the proper provision
for health care.
What Can We Learn from the
Chernobyl Experience?
Chernobyl was the first major accident to a
civil nuclear power plant that released huge
amounts of radioactive isotopes into the envi-
ronment. It came as no surprise that there was
worldwide public concern, even where doses
to the public were tiny (although because of
the large population involved, the collective
dose was higher than in the immediately
affected areas). There have been many smaller
incidents involving accidental public exposure
to radiation, most notably the Three Mile
Island accident (Pennsylvania), arguably as
severe as Chernobyl but with secondary con-
tainment (not present in the Chernobyl reac-
tor), which largely prevented release of
radioactivity to the environment (Weidner
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some degree from a lack of understanding of
the effects of ionizing radiation, and it might
be assumed that the international scientific
community would be well equipped to allay
at least some of these fears. Although this was
attempted, initially with the International
Chernobyl Project and later with three con-
ferences around the 10th anniversary, it had
not succeeded in 2001 when the UN needs
assessment mission visited the affected regions
15 years after the accident.
As stated above, the lack of scientiﬁc con-
sensus is at least in part due to the state of ﬂux
concerning the understanding of the ways in
which radiation affects health, and it is under-
standable that bodies such as the ICRP are
reluctant to change radiation protection stan-
dards. The IAEA is bound by a mandate to fol-
low the ICRP dogma. The WHO should be
freer to express alternative views. It is regret-
table that the WHO played only a minor role
in the International Chernobyl Project, which
failed to recognize the importance of the CTCs
reported to them.
The WHO and IAEA have both made
major contributions, but their failures had a
number of implications. The delay in the
acceptance of the increase in CTC delayed
assistance to the affected countries. The
1995/1996 conferences were to a degree mis-
managed and missed a major opportunity to
create a framework for the future. The major
problems with IPHECA contributed greatly
to the lack of international coordination and
also meant that the International Thyroid
Project was never adequately supported.
Perhaps the biggest failure resulted from the
widespread belief that the IAEA, and in its
wake the WHO, wished to disbelieve or min-
imize the health consequences of Chernobyl,
leaving the suspicion that health detriment
was being covered up.
With globalization comes the increasing
likelihood that accidents, including nuclear
accidents, will occur, with impacts crossing
national boundaries or presenting challenges
beyond the capacity of individual states.
Natural disasters such as hurricanes and earth-
quakes remind us of the high level of coordina-
tion and commitment required to respond
effectively to such events. One can hardly cele-
brate the success of the international commu-
nity in responding to the Chernobyl accident
20 years after the event.
Declining resources of gas and oil, the
recognition of global climate change induced
by burning of fossil fuels, and the threat of
deliberate cessation of energy supply are forc-
ing many countries to rethink the role of
nuclear power in energy supply. As a salutary
example of nuclear technology failure, the
Chernobyl accident should give pause for
thought. Clearly, rational decisions on future
energy policy need to be made in light of the
risks that alternative strategies incur. It is
important to recognize that the accident hap-
pened in a reactor lacking secondary contain-
ment and that adequate precautions to
protect public health were not always taken
after the accident.
Action is needed to ensure adequate
understanding of the health problems follow-
ing Chernobyl; this requires creating and
funding a structure to allow studies to con-
tinue for the lifetime of those exposed to the
accident. The creation of the Atomic Bomb
Commission (now renamed the Radiation
Effects Research Foundation) was critical to
understanding the health consequences of
atomic bomb exposure. A similar organization
could still provide an appropriate framework
for Chernobyl studies. The rivalry and lack of
coordination between many organizations,
UN agencies, countries and others that fol-
lowed Chernobyl must be avoided in future
international-scale accidents. The UN should
initiate an independent review of the response
to Chernobyl, including the actions and
assignments of the UN agencies involved. It
should also advise on the organization neces-
sary for future accidents. The Radiation
Effects Research Foundation provides a model
of international cooperation with independent
scientists involved. Chernobyl is undoubtedly
a more complicated situation, but the princi-
ples of cooperation rather than rivalry and
independence remain essential.
We do not believe that the Chernobyl acci-
dent should necessarily be regarded as an insur-
mountable obstacle to future nuclear power
development, although any new reactors must
have secondary containment. We have stressed
the uncertainties involved in predicting the
long-term consequences of Chernobyl and
believe this approach to be far preferable to
either downplaying or exaggerating the risks.
We do believe that the responses of the major
international organizations to the Chernobyl
accident were inadequate and show the need
for a review by the United Nations of their
assignments and coordination and for the
development of a new strategy for dealing with
future disasters. Above all, we believe that it
would be a dereliction of duty by the world
community if it did not ensure continuing
study of the consequences of a tragic accident
that we hope will never recur.
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